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INTRODUCTION

The Independent Counsel is an independent prosecutorial officer
whose sole function is to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute alleged illegalities perpetrated by high government officials.' The Independent Counsel focuses primarily on the executive branch of government. 2 Thus, to successfully investigate and prosecute executive
branch officials, the President and the Attorney General have minimal

*Authors Note: I would like to thank Editors-in-Chief Susan L. Turner and Karen M.
Chastain for their advice, encouragement, and patience.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982 & Supp. II). See Banks, When They Get Close 0o the Truth:
Challengingthe Special Prosecutors,38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 623, 624-25 (1987). For a discussion
of the history, procedures, and constitutionality of the independent counsel, see Kramer &
Smith, The Special ProsecutorAct: ProposalsFor 1983, 66 MINN. L. REV. 963 (1982).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1982 & Supp. III).
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participation in appointment, removal, and supervision of the Independent Counsel. 3
The Ethics in Government Act created the Office of Independent
Counsel. 4 Since 1979, 5 several Independent Counsels have been appointed and have conducted investigations. Until recently, no one seriously challenged the legitimacy of the office. 6 Now, however, the Independent Counsel is in the forefront of public debate. High profile
Reagan administration officials, such as Attorney General Edwin
Meese, Michael Deaver, and Oliver North, have been investigated by
the Independent Counsel and have forced the courts to reconsider the
role of this controversial figure. Additionally, two Independent Counsels recently won the only two convictions, directly or indirectly, under
7
the Ethics in Government Act.
Some of the scrutinized officials responded by attacking the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel.8 In doing so, they have
sparked a debate that cuts to the heart of our system of government.
The constitutional attack on the Independent Counsel is multifaceted. 9
However, the central argument is that the Independent Counsel vio-

3.

Id. §§ 591-598.

4. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified in scattered

sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.c., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., & 28 U.S.C. (1978)). Under this act, the
Independent Counsel was originally referred to as "Special Prosecutor." Id.; see Note, Fallen
Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of the
Practical, Constitutional,and Political Tensions in the Special ProsecutorProvisions of the
Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113, 113 nn.1-4 (1982).
5. Arthur H. Christy was the first Special Prosecutor appointed under the Act in 1979.
See Note, supra note 4, at 124.
6. See Deaver v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 3177 (1987); In re Sealed Case No. 87-5261,
838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988); In re Sealed Case No. 87-5247, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
In re Sealed Case No. 87-5168, 827 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Deaver v. Seymour, 656 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1987); North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp.
414 (D.D.C. 1987); In re Sealed Case No. 87-0197 (D.D.C. July 20, 1987) (memorandum adjudging
constitutionality of the Independent Counsel).
7. Former Presidential Aide Michael Deaver was recently convicted of perjury, which stemmed from his testimony before a grand jury investigating him for alleged Ethics Act violations;
former Presidential Aide Lynn Nofziger was recently convicted of actual influence peddling
under the Ethics Act. It should be noted that most of the current Independent Counsels have
received and accepted official back-up appointments from the Justice Department, thereby somewhat minimizing the ultimate effects of constitutional challenges on the statute. However, the
Independent Counsels in the Michael Deaver and Theodore Olson cases did not accept back-up
appointments with the Justice Department.
8. See Brief for Appellant, In re Sealed Case No. 87-5261, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter Brief] (on file); Brief of Amicus Curiae Michael K. Deaver, In re Sealed Case No.
87-5261, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (on file).
9. See Brief, supra note 8; Amicus Brief, supra note 8; see also Banks, supranote 1.
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lates the separation of powers doctrine.' 0 According to its detractors,
the Independent Counsel usurps the President's plenary power to
"faithfully execute the laws of the land," ' because it places unfettered
prosecutorial power in an officer who need not answer to the President
or subsequently to the public.Y
Supporters of the Independent Counsel contend that the Independent Counsel is a proper delegation of authority to an independent

officer.3 Although the Independent Counsel's function has traditionally
been executive, delegation of this function to an officer outside the

executive branch is constitutionally permissible. 4 The powers of government remain separate because no one branch controls the Independent Counsel, and thus it neither deprives nor aggrandizes the power
of any branch. 5 Furthermore, the Independent Counsel efficiently and

legitimately investigates and prosecutes high government officials already too involved with the normal investigative and prosecutorial
6
functions of the executive branch.1
Interestingly, both sides of this debate have the same goal: preserving the legitimacy of the executive branch. Both sides have presented

their arguments in court. 17 In recent litigation, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
Independent Counsel was unconstitutional because it violated the sep-

aration of powers doctrine.' 8 On appeal, the United States Supreme

10. Brief, supra note 8, at 3; Amicus Brief,supranote 8, at 3; Banks, supranote 1, at 626.
11. Article II has been the subject of conflicting interpretation. Tradition suggests that
Article II of the Constitution empowers the President to execute the law. Most administrative
practices, however, suggest that the President possesses no special constitutional authority to
execute the laws, but instead supervises execution of the laws by congressional officers. See
Ledewitz, The UncertainPower of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REv. 757,
759 (1979).
12. Brief, supranote 8, at 33-39; Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 4-7. Under the American
system of government, all executive branch officials are theoretically answerable to the public
through the popular election of the President.
13. See In re Sealed Case No. 87-5261, 838 F.2d 476, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Banks, supra
note 1, at 635-38; Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses
of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REV. 59, 85-102 (1983).
14. Banks, supra note 1, at 627.
15. Id. at 643-51.
16. See In re Sealed Case No. 87-5261, 838 F.2d at 504; Banks, supra note 1, at 635-36.
17. See In re Sealed Case No. 87-5168, 827 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Olson, 818
F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Deaver v. Seymour, 656 F. Supp. 900 (D.C.C. 1987); North v. Walsh,
656 F. Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1987); In re Sealed Case 87-0197 (D.D.C. July 20, 1987) (memorandum
adjudging constitutionality of Independent Counsel).
18. In re Sealed Case No. 87-5261, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A three judge panel
decided the case in a 2-1 vote.
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Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, and held that the Independent Counsel was constitutional. 19
This note considers the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel in light of separation of powers principles. First, this note discusses
the historical background and relevant provisions of the Independent
Counsel legislation. The note then examines the separation of powers
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, focusing on the tension between
two competing separation of powers theories. The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals decision is then discussed in light of the Supreme Court's
separation of powers jurisprudence. Finally, the note examines the
recent Supreme Court decision on the Independent Counsel. The note
concludes with some thoughts regarding the impact of the Independent
Counsel decision and its effect on the Supreme Court's separation of
powers jurisprudence.
II.

HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

A. Son of Watergate
The Independent Counsel was created in the aftermath of Watergate. 2° Allegations of cover-up activities, some of which implicated
Justice Department officials,21 forced President Nixon to appoint Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox to investigate these activities.2 However, when Special Prosecutor Cox subpoenaed White House tapes,2
President Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire
Cox.?A

The Attorney General refused and subsequently resigned.5

When Deputy Attorney General William Ruckleshaus also refused to
fire Cox, Nixon dismissed him. 26 Finally, Solicitor General Robert
Bork, acting as Attorney General, fired Cox.Y
This "Saturday Night Massacre" outraged the public. 29 Public
pressure forced Nixon to appoint a second Special Prosecutor, Leon

19. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). The decision was 7-1 with Scalia, J., dissenting.
Kennedy, J., took no part in consideration or decision of this case.
20. See Note, supra note 4.
21. Tiefer, supra note 13, at 62-63.
22. Note, supra note 4, at 117.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 118.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Jaworski.30 Prior to accepting the position, Jaworski insisted on assur-

ances that he would not be removed. 3 1 In response, the Attorney
General promulgated Justice Department regulations granting these
assurances. The Special Prosecutor then subpoenaed the White House
tapes. 13 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the subpoena in
United States v. Nixon,3 and legitimated the concept of the "independent" prosecutor. The Saturday Night Massacre presented a particularly troublesome concern: the conflict of interest between the Attorney General as the executive branch officer charged with prosecuting
high government officials and the Attorney General as the political
ally of executive branch defendants. 3As a result, Congress considered
36
many proposals to remedy this conflict.

B. The Ethics in Government Act
In 1978, Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act.3 7 The Act
provided for the appointment of an independent Special Prosecutor to
investigate and prosecute allegations against high government officials.3 Under the Act, the Independent Counsel process begins when
the Attorney General receives information that a high government
official has violated federal criminal law.39 If the Attorney General
believes the information warrants an investigation, he must conduct
a preliminary investigation within ninety days. 40 Unless the Attorney
General finds that no reasonable grounds exist to warrant further

30.

Tiefer, supra note 13, at 63.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34.
35.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Note, supra note 4, at 118.

36. See Kramer & Smith, supra note 1, at 965-68. Watergate also generated additional
proposals for government reform legislation. See generally Tiefer, supra note 13 (discussing
four oversight framework laws passed in the post Watergate era).
37. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). Originally promulgated in 1978, Congress
subsequently renewed the Act twice. Congress first renewed the Act in 1983. Pub. L. No.
97-409. The Act was renewed again in 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-191. Since its creation, Congress
has subjected the Act to various amendments. Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987); Pub.
L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2030 (1984); Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). However, the
essence remains the same as originally created. Because this note considers issues that occurred
before the 1987 Amendments were effective, the 1987 changes are not discussed.
38. The Independent Counsel provisions are codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982 & Supp.
III).
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591, 592 (1987).
40. Id. § 592(a)(1).
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investigation,'41 he must request the appointment of an Independent
Counsel. 42 A special three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia then appoints the Independent Counsel. 43 The
three-judge panel also defines the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the
Independent Counsel, 44 and may expand this jurisdiction during the
investigation. 45
Once appointed, the Independent Counsel has full investigatory
46
and prosecutorial powers, equal to those of the Attorney General.
47
He is required to comply with the policies of the Justice Department
4
"except when not possible." The Independent Counsel must also report periodically to the three-judge panel 49 and also to various Congressional committees if so askedY' The Attorney General may remove an
Independent Counsel for "good cause." 1 Independent Counsel removal
is subject to judicial review 2 The Act thus creates an autonomous
officer, empowered with broad authority, and subject to little constraint.
Most constitutional attacks focus on the Act's appointment and
removal provisions. 53 The primary criticism is that by restricting the
President's authority to appoint and remove the Independent Counsel,
Congress has interfered with the President's constitutional mandate
to execute the "laws of the land."54 Despite other constitutional attacks,
the President's constitutional mandate to execute the law goes to the
heart of the issue. 5

41. Id. § 592(b)(1).
42. Id. § 592(c)(1).
43. Id. § 49.
44. Id. § 593(b).
45. Id. § 593(c).
46. Id. § 594(a).
47. Id. § 594(t).
48. Id. Thus, the Independent Counsel is almost entirely autonomous.
49. Id. § 595(b)(1).
50. Id. § 595(a).
51. Id. § 596(a)(1). The Independent Counsel is also removable for "physical disability,
mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such
independent counsel's duties." Id.
52. Id. § 596(a)(3). An Independent Counsel may obtain judicial review of removal in a
civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court
may reinstate the Independent Counsel, or grant other appropriate relief. Id.
53. See supra notes 8-12.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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III.

THE SUPREME COURTS ODYSSEY: SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND THE PRESIDENTS DUTY TO FAITHFULLY
EXECUTE THE LAW

A. Control Versus Function
Although separation of powers controversies arose at the inception
of the Constitution,5 the natural starting point for separation of powers
analysis is Myers v. United States.57 In Myers, the Court considered
the President's exclusive power to remove an executive officer appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. 8 The President
removed a Federal Postmaster before the conclusion of his Congressionally prescribed term. 9 The Postmaster contested his dismissal,
and questioned the President's power to remove him prematurely. 60
The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft 6 1 upheld the
President's power to remove executive officers before their congressionally granted terms of office expired.6 2
In a lengthy opinion, Chief Justice Taft reviewed the Framers'
intent regarding the executive branch and its relationship with Congress.63 His conclusion was somewhat an exercise of the obvious: Congress prescribes the duties and duration of executive offices, while
the President unilaterally ensures that executive officers faithfully
execute the law.6 However, the Chief Justice added that the President's unfettered power of removal is the chief mechanism available
to ensure that executive appointees execute the law.6
56. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
58. Id. at 106.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Interestingly, Chief Justice Taft was a former President.
62. 272 U.S. at 176.
63. Id. at 109-45. Chief Justice Taft examined at length the records of the Constitutional
Convention, the first Congress, and also the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 272 U.S. at 109-45.
64. 272 U.S. at 132-33. 'q"e duties which are thus imposed upon him [the President] he
is further enabled to perform by the recognition in the Constitution, and the creation by acts
of Congress, of executive departments.

.

. ."

Id. at 133.

65. Id. at 133-35. '"The moment that he [the President] loses confidence in the intelligence,
ability, judgment or loyalty of any one of them [executive officials], he must have the power
to remove him without delay." Id. at 134. Furthermore,
mhe ability and judgment manifested by the official thus empowered, as well as
his energy and stimulation of his subordinates, are subjects which the President
must consider and supervise in his administrative control. Finding such officers to
be negligent and inefficient, the President should have the power to remove them.
Id. at 135.
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Chief Justice Taft did not limit his discussion to the removal of
the Postmaster, who performed only administrative duties that were
purely executive functions. Instead, Taft authorized the removability
of all executive officers, regardless of their function.6 Taft recognized
that some officers may have duties not exclusively executive in nature.Y Although the President may not properly influence particular
non-executive decisions, Taft held that the president may constitutionally dismiss an official because of the official's non-executive actions.6
Taft's reasoning created the control analysis of separation of powers
problems. From a formalistic reading of the Constitution, the President
has sole power to execute the law. He, therefore, must have plenary
power to control all executive officers, regardless of their function.
Thus, the control analysis focuses on the branch appointing or removing the executive officer. As long as one branch of government controls
the officer, he cannot perform the duties of another branch. Logically
then, if one branch appoints or removes the officer, then the officer,
regardless of his duties, will always be considered part of that branch.
Despite Taft's control analysis jurisprudence, growth of the administrative state during the New Deal tested the broad language of
Myers. Just eleven years later, Humphrey's Executor v. United
States9 substantially narrowed Myers. In Humphrey's Executor, the
estate of a Federal Trade Commissioner brought suit contesting Humphrey's removal from the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") by President Roosevelt.70 President Hoover appointed Humphrey to the Com71
mission and Congress established his term of office as seven years.

66. Id. Chief Justice Taft addressed many specific points in reaching this general conclusion,
and also considered at length the conflict between President Andrew Johnson and Congress
regarding the authority to remove executive officers. Id. at 164-69. One piece of legislation
central to the conflict between President Johnson and Congress was the Tenure of Office Act
of 1876, which provided the statutory basis for the controversy in Myers. Id. at 176.
Both'Justice Holmes and Justice McReynolds, in their dissents, rejected the Chief Justice's
interpretation, and focused instead on the power of Congress to create, abolish, and circumscribe
executive departments. Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting), 178-295 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 135.
68. Id. The Chief Justice also stated:
[Tihere may be duties of a quasi judicial character imposed on executive officers
. . . the discharge of which the President cannot in a particular case properly
influence or control. But even in such a case he may consider the decision ... a
reason for removing the officer. . .. Otherwise he does not discharge his own
constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfilly executed.
Id.
69. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
70. Id. at 618-19.
71. Id. at 618.
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Roosevelt replaced Humphrey with a Commissioner of his own choos-

ing. 72 Humphrey argued that, because Congress fixed his term at
seven years, the President could not prematurely remove him.7 In
contrast, the President asserted that legislative prohibitions on the
executive branch's power to remove executive officers unconstitutionally interfered with the executive branch.7 4
The Humphrey's Executor Court held that the President did not
have unfettered power to remove the Federal Trade Commissioner. 75

By limiting Myers to its facts, 76 the Court made an important distinction in separation of powers jurisprudence. It abandoned the formalistic reading of the relationship between branches of government. Instead, the Court focused not on the branch controlling the officer in
question, but on the nature of the officer's function.The Court then characterized the FTC's function as "quasi legislative or quasi-judicial." 711According to the Court, the FTC was not
truly "an arm or an eye of the executive." Therefore, Congress could
fix the term of office for commissioners, and forbid their premature
removal by the President.80

72. Id. at 618-19.
73. Id. at 619.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 632. Recognizing the precedential effect of Myers, Justice Sutherland narrowed
Myers to its facts. Id. at 626.
76. Id. Justice Sutherland stated:
[Tihe narrow point actually decided was only that the President had power to
remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of the
Senate, as required by act of Congress. In the course of the opinion of the court,
expressions occur which tend to sustain the government's contention, but these
are beyond the point involved, and therefore, do not come within the rule of stare
decisis. In so far as they are out of harmony with the views here set forth, these
expressions are disapproved.
Id.
77. Id. at 627-30. Myers, the Court stated "goes far enough to include all purely executive
officers. It goes no further." Id. at 627-28.
78. Id. at 628.
79. Id. Justice Sutherland focused on the fact that the Federal Trade Commission was
wholly disconnected from the executive, and functioned mainly as an agency of the legislative
and judicial departments. Id. at 630.
80. Id. at 629. In so holding, the Court recognized "[t]he fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control.., of
either of the others . . . , [but acknowledged the desirability of having executive officers who
could] maintain an attitude of independence against [the President's] will." Id.
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Humphrey's Executor thus introduced the functional analysis of
separation of powers. Separation of powers analysis turned from
analysis of the branch controlling the officer to analysis of the function
of the officer. The question became not "who controls the officer?"
but "what is the officer's function?" If the officer's function is purely
executive, then the officer is in the executive branch.
B.

The Burger Court's Anomaly

In the last twelve years, the Supreme Court decided three important separation of powers cases. 8 ' The first case, Buckley v. Valeo,82
continues the logic of Humphrey's Executor. In Buckley, the Court
considered the validity of the appointment process for members of the
Federal Election Commission (the "Commission"). Under the former
process, six voting members comprised the Commission. The President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President each appointed two members." Both Houses
of Congress had to confirm the six appointees, and none of the three
appointing officers could choose both of their appointees from the same
political party.m
The Commission performed recordkeeping, investigatory, rulemaking, and adjudicatory functions.m Additionally, the Commission could
institute civil actions to implement its duties. The decision to litigate
rested entirely with the Commission, and did not require the Attorney
General's concurrence.Y
The Court held that this arrangement violated the separation of
powers doctrine. The Court focused on the expansive enforcement
powers of the Commission. 9 According to the Court, initiating litiga81. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see, e.g., Chemerinsky, A
Paradox Without Principal:A Comment on the Burger Court's Jurisprudencein Separation
of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (1987).
82. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

83. Id. at 1. The entire Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was challenged, and much
of the opinion is devoted to discussion of the contribution caps, expenditure caps, public financing,
and reporting requirements of the legislation. Id.
84.

Id. at 113.

85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 111-13.

87. Id. at 111. Apparent criminal violations were referred to the Attorney General. Id. at
n.153.
88. Id. at 143. The expenditure caps and public finance provisions were also held unconstitutional. Id. at 143-44.

89. Id. at 138. '"he Commission's enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary
power to seek judicial relief, is authority that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of
the legislative functions of Congress." Id.
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tion to enforce election laws was a function inherently executive in
character. 9° Therefore, only a legal subdivision of the executive branch
could perform this function. 91 By vesting appointment power partially
in Congress, the Commission appointment legislation impermissibly
invaded the province of the executive.9
The Court emphasized the function of the officers, 93 not whether
the executive versus legislative branch controlled the office. The Court
recognized the need for interbranch interdependence,9 stating that "a
hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one
another would preclude the establishment of a nation capable of governing itself effectively. ' 95 However, enforcing election laws through
litigation struck at the core of the executive branch's duty to faithfully
execute the law.9 It must therefore belong solely to the executive.W
The Court also acknowledged the inherent conflict when an incumbent
President, running for re-election, controls appointments to the Federal Election Commission.98 According to the Court, however, "such
fears, however rational, do not by themselves warrant a distortion of
the Framers' work." 99
Buckley apparently cemented the functional analysis of separation
of powers firmly in place. Yet, the Supreme Court recreated the
confusion in a separation of powers case that dealt with a process
rather than an independent officer. In Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadha,'°° the Court retreated from the functional approach.
In Chadha, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of section 244(c)(2)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' 0' The Act allowed the Attorney General to suspend an Immigration and Naturalization Service
order to deport an alien. Yet, either House of Congress could, by
resolution, overrule the Attorney General's decision. °2 This override
90. Id.
91. Id. at 140.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 137-43.
94. Id. at 121-22.
95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. at 138.
97. Id. at 138-39. The Court concluded that: "a lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach
of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress that the Constitution entrusts
responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. III. § 3." Id. at 139.
98. Id. at 134.
99. Id.
100. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
101. Id. at 924-25; see Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
102. 462 U.S. at 925. The Attorney General could suspend the deportation if the alien was
present in the United States for at least seven years, was of good moral character, and would
be subject to extreme hardship if deported. Id.
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is known as a "congressional veto."'10 3 In Chadha, the Attorney General
suspended the INS order deporting Chadha, but the House of Representatives overruled the Attorney General's decision.0'4 Chadha then
challenged the constitutionality of the congressional veto, arguing that
it interfered with the executive's discretion to execute immigration
laws.

05

The Court held the congressional veto unconstitutional. 106 The
Court applied the same reasoning employed in earlier cases dealing
with an independent officer. The Court purported to use the functional
analysis, c1° but instead focused on the congressional veto's role in the
Constitution. °s In essence, the opinion analyzed who controlled the
congressional veto process. The Court tautologically reasoned that
because Congress controlled the congressional veto, it was legislative
action. 109
Legislative actions must comport with the Presentments Clause1 0
of the Constitution. The Presentments Clause requires the legislature
to present all legislative actions to the President for signing or veto.,'
Because the congressional veto was legislative action not conforming
to the Presentments Clause, it was unconstitutional.112 More importantly, it interfered with an executive branch decision to execute immigration laws."1

103. Id. at 944. The mechanism is also commonly referred to as a "legislative veto."
104. Id. at 924-28. No real reason was given for vetoing the suspension of deportation,
except for a statement by the Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law to the effect that Chadha had failed to show any hardship
inherent in his deportation. Id. at 927.
105. Id. at 928.
106. Id. at 959.
107. Id. at 951. "Although not 'hermetically' sealed from one another, Buckley v. Valeo,
[424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)], the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable."
Id.
108. Id. at 952-59.
109. Id. at 952.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.3. "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question
of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same
shall take Effect, shall be approved by him ....
" Id.
111. Chad/a, 462 U.S. at 946-48.
112. Id. at 959.
113. Id. at 957-59. "[The carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not
be eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case
requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for
legislative action ... ." Id. at 958.
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In Chadha, the Court condemned the use of all congressional
vetos.'14 Yet, the Court did not examine the true function of the
congressional veto. Both Justice Powell's concurrence"5 and Justice
White's dissent 16 exposed the infirmity in the decision. Both pointed
out the Court's departure from functional analysis. Justice Powell
looked at the function performed by Congress when it exercises the
congressional veto. Powell then characterized the congressional veto,
as applied, as a "judicial function. ' '1 17 Utilizing the same analysis, Jus-

tice White reasoned that the congressional veto, as applied, functioned
as a congressional circumscription on Congress' own legislation. 11 Because the congressional veto did not intrude into the functions of the
other branches, it did not violate separation of powers." 9
Chadha evidenced the Court's retreat to the control approach in
separation of powers problems. Although Chadhaaddressed a process
rather than an independent officer, it foreshadowed future analysis
for independent officer controversies. Indeed, Bowsher v. Synari.2
represented the next step in the Court's regression from the functional
to the control approach. In Bowsher, the Court confronted the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction legislation.2" Specifically, the Court addressed whether the provision requiring the Comptroller General to implement automatic spending reductions violated separation of powers.= Under law, only Congress could
remove the Comptroller General.m

114. This decision generated a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supranote 81.
115. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted that the Court either served
as a primary fact-finder, or at least a reviewer of facts found by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 965 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell felt these functions were
"clearly adjudicatory." Id. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Powell would hold that

this legislative veto deprived the judiciary of its constitutional authority. Id. at 966 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
118. Id. at 1000-02 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White felt this was a constitutionally
permissible, and necessary infringement of executive power. Id. at 1000 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White also stated that the suspension and deportation of aliens was not an executive
function. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was careful not to say that all
legislative vetos were necessarily constitutional. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White particularly noted that '"a] legislative check on an inherently executive function, for example that

of initiating prosecutions, poses an entirely different question." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
120. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
121. Id. at 717-18.
122. Id. at 717.
123. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1982).
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In holding that the Comptroller General would violate separation
of powers under the deficit-reduction legislation,M the Court resurrected the control approach. The Court did not focus on the Comptroller General's function, but examined which branch controlled the

Comptroller General.na The Court summarily concluded that the
Comptroller General's role in the proposed legislation was to execute
the law. 1 6 Yet Congress, not the President, can remove the Comptroller General. Congress therefore controls the Comptroller General and,
as a legislative officer, the Comptroller General may not execute the
law.m
Dissenting, Justice White lamented 'the Court's willingness to in-

terpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers
....
" Justice White characterized the Comptroller General's function
as legislative rather than executive. Thus, congressional control over
the Comptroller General was permissible in the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-

lings Act. m
Thus, Bowsher brought the analysis full circle. The Court revived
the control approach to separation of powers problems. Therein lay
the anomaly: which analysis would the court choose in the next separa-

124. 478 U.S. at 736.
125. Id. 725-28. The Court seemed very concerned about which branch really "controlled"
the Comptroller General. Id.
126. Id. at 726. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, characterized
the Comptroller General's role as one of a poicymaker, and thus legislative. Id. at 737 (Stevens,
J., concurring). However, Justice Stevens also expressed his distaste for the entire functional
analysis, stating that duties often cannot be readily characterized as a function of one particular
branch. Id. at 748-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 726. The Court further stated: "[b]ecause Congress had retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive powers." Id. at 732.
Furthermore, "The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws;
it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess."
Id. at 726.
128. Id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's analysis was decidedly functional:
[T]here are undoubtedly executive functions that regardless of the enactments of
Congress, must be performed by officers subject to removal at will by the President.
Whether a particular function falls within this class, or within the far larger class
that may be relegated to independent officers "will depend upon the character of
the office." Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631, 55 S. Ct. at 875.
Id. at 762 (White, J., dissenting); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 443 (1977) (proper focus is on the extent to which the executive is prevented from accomplishing executive functions).
129. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 763-66 (White, J., dissenting). "Reliance on such an unyielding
principle to strike down a statute posing no real danger of aggrandizement of congressional
power is extremely misguided. . . ." Id. at 776.
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tion of powers case? The Independent Counsel issue arose in this
unsettled state of affairs. Handling this issue would help resolve the
Court's separation of powers chaos.
IV.

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

A. The Current Controversy:
The D.C. Circuit Wrestles With the Anomaly
With mixed signals from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia considered both separation of powers
analyses in the context of the Independent Counsel. In In Re: Sealed
Case No. 87-5261,13 the D.C. Circuit heard the appeals of three former
government officials subpoenaed by an Independent Counsel to testify
before a grand jury. 131 The grand jury was investigating allegations
against former Assistant Attorney General Theodore Olson."' To
further the investigation, Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison requested that the Attorney General expand her jurisdiction to subpoena
other former government officials."' The Attorney General denied her
request for expanded jurisdiction.,' Morrison then made a similar
request of the Special Court that appointed her."' The Special Court
granted jurisdiction," 6 allowing Morrison to subpoena the former gov37
ernment officials.
The officials moved to quash the subpoenas on the grounds that
the Independent Counsel was unconstitutional."' The district court

130. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
131. Id. at 480.
132. Id. at 479.
133. Id. at 479-80. Morrison wanted to investigate Edward Schmults and Carol Dinkins.
Id. at 479. The independent counsel derives this authority from 28 U.S.C. § 594(e), which states
in pertinent part:
An independent counsel may ask the Attorney General or the division of the court
to refer to the independent counsel matters related to the independent counsel's
prosecutorial jurisdiction, and the Attorney General or the division of the court as
the case may be, may refer such matters.
28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (Supp. 1988).
134. 838 F. 2d at 480. The Attorney General denied her request on the grounds that
initial investigations yielded no reasonable grounds for continuing an investigation against
Schmults and Dinkins. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Special Court denied expanded jurisdiction to separately investigate Schmults
and Dinkins. However, the Special Court held that the original grant ofjurisdiction to investigate,
Theodore Olson implicitly gave the Independent Counsel authority to investigate others Olson
might have conspired with, including Schmults and Dinkins. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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refused. 139 The former government officials then refused to appear

before the grand jury, and were held in contempt.' 40 Appealing the
contempt order, the former government officials again challenged the
constitutionality of the Independent Counsel.141
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and held the Independent Counsel unconstitutional.'4 Initially, the court found that the
Independent Counsel appointment process violated the Appointments
Clause.'4 However, the court later focused on the separation of powers
issueM in light of Supreme Court precedent. '45 The court concluded
that the Independent Counsel's primary function was to prosecute
crimes, a "core" executive function. 46 Because the Independent Counsel performs a function distinctly executive in character, the Independent Counsel must be an executive officer. As an executive officer,
only the executive branch may appoint and supervise the Independent
Counsel. 47 By having a prosecutor who need not answer to the executive, the Independent Counsel deprives the executive branch of its
ability to faithfully execute the law.'4
The D.C. Circuit applied functional analysis to the Independent
Counsel. The court focused on the Independent Counsel's role in investigating and prosecuting criminal acts. 49 The court determined that
these "core" functions of the executive branch must be performed
solely by executive branch officers.' 5° A mechanism that vests prosecutorial powers in an officer outside the executive branch deprives

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 487.

144. Id. at 487-518. The court specifically said that it was addressing the additional claims
so that
process.
145.
146.

the
Id.
Id.
Id.

Supreme Court would have a full lower court opinion to help speed the appeal
at 487.
at 487-518.
at 488-89. Judge Ginsburg, in her dissent, recognized prosecution of crimes as a

"properly typed" executive function, but not a "core" executive function. Id. at 526-28 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 488-89.
148. Id. at 490. "[A] statute that vests the appointment of an officer who prosecutes the
criminal law in some branch other than the executive obstructs the President's ability to execute

the law. .

. ."

Id. In contrast, the dissent saw the Independent Counsel provision as a proper

circumscription of executive function. Id. at 524-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

149. Id. at 500-01.
150. Id.
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the executive of one of its core functions.

151 Such

deprivation is uncon-

stitutional. 152
This analysis mirrors the reasoning of Buckley.as In Buckley, the
Federal Elections Commission's function - to bring civil lawsuits prompted the court to render the appointment process unconstitutional.1- The Supreme Court viewed civil litigation as an executive
function.ca The D.C. Circuit extended this logic. If instituting civil
lawsuits was an executive function, then instituting criminal prosecutions was a purely executive function.1 6 Therefore, only an executive
157
officer could prosecute criminal violations.
The D.C. Circuit expressly declined to consider the Independent
Counsel from a control approach. In arguing that her office was constitutional, the Independent Counsel argued for the control approach. 6
That is, the Independent Counsel was constitutional because it did
not allow one branch to control another. 5 9 The Independent Counsel
was a totally independent officer, answering to no branch of govern6
ment. 16° Thus, no branch has usurped an executive function.1 1
This argument draws upon Chadha and Bowsher. In both cases,
either a legislatively controlled process, 6 2 or a legislatively appointed
officer ' 6s sought to control executive functions, and were thus held
unconstitutional. In In Re: Sealed Case No. 87-5621,164 the Independent Counsel argued that her office was not controlled by another
branch of government.as Under the Chadha and Bowsher decisions,
she could constitutionally prosecute crimes, concededly an executive

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
154. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976).
155. Id. at 140.
156. In re Sealed Case No. 87-5261, 838 F.2d 476, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
157. Id. But see Banks, supra note 1 (The executive performs political and non-political
functions, and only the political functions are purely executive functions. The prosecution of
crimes is a non-political function.); Tiefer, supranote 13 (also discussing the political/non-political

dichotomy of executive functions).
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

In re Sealed Case No. 87-5261, 838 F.2d at 490-91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 507.
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function. 1' The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, and declined to
apply the control approach.67 Instead, the court analyzed the Independent Counsel functionally and held it unconstitutional.l28
B. Morrison v. Olson: The Triumph of Control Over Function?
The Supreme Court, however, did not share the D.C. Circuit's
view. In Morrison v. Olson, 69 the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit,
declaring the Independent Counsel constitutional .17 The Court not
only approved the Independent Counsel, but endorsed the control
analysis of separation of powers problems.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned differently from the lower court. While the D.C. Circuit dispatched the
various Appointments Clause arguments, 7 1 the Chief Justice focused
first and substantially on these points.'1 The Chief Justice decided
that the Independent Counsel was an 'nferior officer," whose appointment could properly be vested in the judiciary.'7 Thus, the Independent Counsel appointment provisions did not violate the Appointments
Clause. T7
Eventually, the Court addressed the separation of powers issues.7r
The court unequivocally employed the control approach to the issue.
The Chief Justice focused on the removal provision of the Ethics in
Government Act. 76 Because the Attorney General could remove the
Independent Counsel for cause, the executive branch maintained some

166. Id.
167. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
168. 838 F.2d at 488-89.
169. 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988).
170. Id. The Court ruled 7-1 on the issue.
171. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
172. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-11.
173. Id. at 2608.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2616-22. Before addressing the separation of powers issue, the Court disposed
of the argument that the Independent Counsel Act conflicted with Article III of the Constitution
by giving the judiciary power over something that was not a case or controversy. Id. at 2611-15.
The Court held that Congress had the power under the Appointments Clause to vest in the
judiciary the powers and duties involving the appointment and grant of jurisdiction to the
Independent Counsel. Id. at 2612-13.
176. Id. at 2616. "The Act instead puts the removal power squarely in the hands of the
Executive Branch; an independent counsel may be removed from office 'only by the personal
action of the Attorney General, and only for good cause' § 596(a)(1)." Id. at 2616 (citation omitted).
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control over the Independent Counsel."1 While the Independent Counsel enjoyed considerable insulation and independence from the executive branch, no separation of powers violation existed if the executive
branch retained some control over the Independent Counsel178
The Chief Justice effectively repudiated the functional approach.
While the D.C. Circuit identified the prosecutorial nature of the Independent Counsel as a "core executive function,"' 79 the Chief Justice
deviated from this "core function" analysis.'8 Because the executive
retained some control over the Independent Counsel, its prosecutorial
nature caused no great consternation for the Chief Justice. 18 The Chief

177. Id. at 2618-20.
[T]his is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has been
completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the President
to insure the "faithful execution" of the laws. Rather, because the independent
counsel may be terminated for "good cause," the Executive, through the Attorney
General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently performing her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the provisions
of the Act.
Id. at 2619 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 2622. The Chief Justice stated:
[I]t is undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or supervision that
the Attorney General and, through him, the President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity ....Nonetheless, the Act does give the Attorney General several means of supervising or
controlling the prosecutorial powers that may be wielded by an independent counsel.
Most importantly, the Attorney General retain the power to remove the counsel
for "good cause," a power that we have already concluded provides the Executive
with substantial ability to ensure that the laws are "faithfully executed" by an
independent counsel.
Id. at 2621.
179. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
180. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2617-19. The Chief Justice stated:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that an analysis of the function served by the officials
at issue is irrelevant. But the real question is whether the removal restrictions
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light.
Id. at 2619.
181. Id. at 2621.
[A]lithough the counsel exercises no small amount of discretion and judgment in
deciding how to carry out her duties under the Act, we simply do not see how
the President's need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central to the
functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law
that the counsel be terminable at will by the President.
Id. at 2619 (citations omitted).
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Justice referred to the functional analysis, 1 but ultimately concluded
that the control approach applied to the separation of powers issue. 13
Justice Scalia, in his lone dissent, lamented abandoning the functional analysis.' M According to Justice Scalia, the majority acknowledged the executive function of the Independent Counsel.'5 Yet, the

majority held that it was constitutionally permissible to vest some of
this executive function in another branch, on the grounds that the
executive retains some control.'1 This baffled Justice Scalia, as he did
not consider a "for cause" removal as "some control"' for the purposes
of separation of powers analysis. Furthermore, he could not abide
vesting an executive function in another branch. 1' Justice Scalia also
discussed the nature of the prosecutorial function and the need for
the Independent Counsel to answer solely to the executive on matters

pertaining to prosecutions. 1 Finally, Justice Scalia criticized the
majority's decision as unsupported by analysis, 19° and denounced the
Court's repudiation of the functional analysis. 9 1

182. Id.
183. Id. at 2621. The Chief Justice concluded:
[N]otwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree "independent" and free
from Executive supervision to a greater extent and other federal prosecutors, in our
view these features of the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the
Independent Counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties.
Id. at 2622
184. Id. at 2622 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Justice Scalia the analysis was simple:
[T]he decision of the Court of Appeals invalidating the present statute must be
upheld on fundamental separation of power principles if the following two questions
are answered affirmatively: (1) is the conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an
investigation to decide whether to prosecute) the exercise of purely executive
power? (2) Does the statute deprive the President of the United States of exclusive
control over the exercise of that power?
Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2619.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "It is not for us to determine, and we have never
presumed to determine, how much of the purely executive powers of the government must be
within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2626-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "In sum, the balancing of various legal, practical
and political considerations, none of which is absolute, is the very essence of prosecutorial
discretion. To take this away is to remove the case of the prosecutorial function, and not merely
'some' presidential control." Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2629-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Tihe most amazing feature of the Court's opinion is that it does not even purport
to give an answer. It simply announces, with no analysis, that the ability to control

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss3/3

20

Lightsey: Constitutional Law: The Independent Counsel and the Supreme Court
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

C.

The Independent Counsel and Separation of
Powers Jurisprudence

What does the Independent Counsel decision say about the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence? First and foremost,
it establishes the control approach as the dominant analysis for separation of powers issues. Considerations regarding the degree of control
one governmental branch maintains over an independent officer now
prevail over the functional approach. Congress may now establish
independent officers who perform executive functions, but who are
not members of the executive branch. As long as Congress grants the
executive some measure of control over independent officers, preferably through a limited removal power, then independent officers are
constitutionally permissible.
The Independent Counsel exemplifies the potential impact of the
control approach. A new beast of American jurisprudence is born: a
prosecutor not answerable to the executive and thus not answerable
to the public.19 The functional approach would not allow this creature.
Focusing purely on the officer's role, the functional approach keeps
executive officers within the confines of the executive branch. Confining executive officers to executive supervision provides for sole executive accountability for the officer's actions.
Finally, is this kind of independent officer desirable? It would seem
not. The justification for the Independent Counsel is that the executive

the decision whether to investigate or prosecute the President's closest advisors,
and indeed the President himself, is not "so central to the functioning of the
Executive Branch" as to be constitutionally required to be within the President's
control. Apparently that is so because we say it is so.
Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2628-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia concluded:
[I1n sum, this statute does deprive the President of substantial control over the
prosecutory functions performed by the independent counsel, and it does substantially affect the balance of powers. That the Court could possibly conclude otherwise
demonstrates both the wisdom of our former constitutional system, in which the
degree of reduced control in political impairment were irrelevant, since all purely
executive power had to be in the President; and the folly of the new system of
standardless judicial allocation of power as we adopt today.
Id. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. See supra note 12; see also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965) (executive
has absolute discretion as to whether there shall be a criminal prosecution), cert. denied, sub.
tosm. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); cf. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 107 S.
Ct. 2124 (1987) (while criminal prosecution is the sole responsibility of the executive, courts
may supervise contempt proceedings because of the judiciary's interest in punishing disobedience
to the court). See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case).
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branch cannot be trusted to investigate and prosecute itself.193 Admittedly, Watergate and a few of the merry pranksters in the Reagan
administration lend some credence to this premise. However, our constitutional system already has sufficient checks to remedy this problem. Although Congress cannot prosecute, it can investigate executive
branch officials. 9 4 Congress can publicly refer the results of its investigations to the Justice Department. The Justice Department would
then be exhorted to act on Congressional findings.
Furthermore, Congress has the power to impeach executive branch
officials' 5 if they suspect "high crimes or misdemeanors.' 9 After the
Saturday Night Massacre, for example, a presidentially-appointed
special prosecutor conducted an investigation of executive branch officials. 1' The Justice Department promulgated regulations guaranteeing his independence. 9 8 Thus, the Watergate violations were prosecuted independently and without altering basic notions of the Constitution. Apparently, the Independent Counsel is well provided for elsewhere in the American constitutional system. The Independent Counsel is therefore a redundant and potentially dangerous constitutional
device.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to establish the
control approach as the preferred separation of powers analysis. Consequently, the Court resolved an anomaly in its separation of powers
jurisprudence. In the process however, the Court created a potential
monster. Had the Court employed a functional analysis of this separation of powers issue, the Independent Counsel problem could have
been avoided. Instead, our constitutional system faces the prospect
of independent executive officers with no accountability to the people
through the executive branch. Further, the need for the Independent
Counsel is redundant because pre-existing constitutional structures
sufficiently fulfill the Independent Counsel's purpose.
Alton L. Lightsey
193. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
194. C.f. Watkdns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (congressional investigatory power
includes probes into executive departments to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste). But
see Brand & Connelly, ConstitutionalConfrontations:Preservinga Prompt and Orderly Means
by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials,
36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986) (congressional investigatory power severely limited by Congress'
inability to criminally prosecute recalcitrant witnesses).
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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